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Rhetorical Counterinsurgency: The FBI and the American Indian Movement 
 
Casey Ryan Kelly 
In 2007, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents Joseph H. and 
John M. Trimbach published a tell-all book to expose the crimes of 
American Indian Movement (AIM) and dispel contemporary myths 
about Bureau conspiracies against Indian activists. The book provides 
an insiders account of the agent’s participation in the investigation 
of AIM and attempts to correct what they characterize as popular 
revisionist history accusing the FBI of gross injustices against Indian 
Country. The agents argue that as far as AIM is concerned, in the halls 
of academia, “There is a market for blurring the historical lines between 
fact and ﬁction” (2007, 6). While the book is cavalier, polemical, and 
one-sided, I take seriously their argument for scholars to revisit this 
controversy and place the FBI’s investigation of AIM within its proper 
historical context. In their effort to exonerate the FBI, however, they 
accuse AIM and its apologists of distorting the true historical record. 
In doing so, the agents dismiss any suggestion that the FBI participated 
in the social construction of that history. Allen Megell and Deirdre M. 
McCloskey suggest, however, that history does not exist outside of 
discourse but rather “is concerned with tropes, arguments, and other 
devices of language used to write history and to persuade audiences” 
(1987, 221). Obsessed with the objective fact of AIM’s alleged terrorist 
activities, the agents seem to dismiss the Bureau’s rhetorical activity 
was, at times, nothing more than poor word choices. In this essay, 
however, I argue that the FBI’s language was central to their approach, 
both in terms of the communicative techniques used to diffuse AIM as 
well as the topoi leveraged to rationalize extreme measures in defense 
of national interests. In revisiting the justiﬁcations for emergency 
measures against AIM, I situate the FBI’s rhetoric within a cultural 
context of limited intellectual resources to comprehend radical 
Indian activism. The FBI utilized communicative techniques that 
2 
 
  
marshaled this limited cultural knowledge as a method of movement 
suppression. I argue that the rhetoric of the FBI’s investigation of AIM 
from 1971 to 1976 illuminates the contours of what I term rhetorical 
counterinsurgency. 
     As ﬁrst explicated by U.S Army Special Forces in 1960 and adapted 
domestically by the FBI’s counterintelligence bureau (COINTELPRO), 
counterinsurgency operations included unconventional military and 
nonmilitary activities to disrupt and destroy dissident movements, 
guerilla organizations, and general revolutionary activity. Such 
operations included direct intervention into media institutions to 
conduct psychological warfare, information warfare, propaganda, and 
disinformation. Counterinsurgency operations required an advanced 
strategic understanding of how communicative practices can be 
marshaled to secure government interests and win the hearts and minds 
of the public. Rhetorical counterinsurgency constitutes a systematic 
and strategic set of communicative techniques or instruments which, 
when used in combination, manage, dissipate, and suppress radicalism. 
Building on the concept of rhetorical exclusion developed by John 
Sanchez, Mary Stuckey, and Richard Morris (1999), I situate such 
communicative practices that work in the interests of the state against 
those of popular movements as a part of modern governance. Ronald 
W. Greene argues that rhetorical practices thought of as technologies 
of governance enable the management of “a population, space, and/ 
or object by articulating an ensemble of human technologies into a 
function network of power to improve public welfare” (1998, 2). 
     While social movement scholarship is strong on the material 
methods by which those in power thwart revolutionary and subversive 
activity, more work needs to be done to explore the inner workings 
of rhetorical practices that provide interpretative guidance to 
discredit the symbolic and argumentative justiﬁcations for social 
protest. To contribute to this theoretical work, I argue that rhetorical 
counterinsurgency is reﬂexive and epistemic. It affects the approach 
of the individuals and institutions who wield it as technique of control 
while it reproduces narrow intellectual interpretations of social protest 
messages. 
     This essay unfolds in three sections. First, I develop a theory of 
rhetorical counterinsurgency and explain its reﬁnement within the 
FBI as a method of threat control and management. Second, I situate 
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rhetorical counterinsurgency within a series of migrating cultural 
contexts, including the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and cultural 
stereotypes of American Indians. These contexts constrained the 
available interpretations of Indian, as well as non-Indian radicalism and 
justiﬁed the application of techniques of counterinsurgency. Finally, 
I offer a rhetorical analysis of both the FBI’s use of communicative 
tactics as a method of counterinsurgency as well as the content of their 
rhetorical constructions of AIM. I investigate two disarming topoi of 
savagery: AIM as communist surrogate and American Viet Cong. 
Rhetorical Dimensions of Counterinsurgency 
     As leveraged against American Indian activism, Sanchez, 
Stuckey, and Morris explain that rhetorical exclusion is (1999, 28) 
“one strategy used by members of the prevailing power structure to 
conceal any antidemocratic consequences of its actions.” As a strategy 
of counterinsurgency, rhetorical exclusion is a mechanism by which 
institutional structures of power mobilize deﬁnitions, images, and other 
symbolic activities to diffuse challenges to its legitimacy while concealing 
its own repressive tactics. Mark Meister and Ann Burnett extend the 
concept of rhetorical exclusion by showing how language strategies, 
particularly at work in the trial transcript of United States v. Leonard 
Peltier, were a part of a strategic order to “interpret the social order so 
that power is legitimized” (2004, 723). Similar to rhetorical exclusion, 
John Murphy and Mary Stuckey (2001) argue that the colonization 
in North America was largely a rhetorical process that primed people 
and land for colonial violence. Furthermore, focusing on its roots in 
early American iconography, rhetorical critic Jeremy Engels connects 
the rhetorical maneuvers of colonizing discourses to demonstrate the 
“relationship between violence, nation-building, rhetorical invention, 
and the colonization of Native Americans” (2005, 2). Anthropologist 
Jeanette Haynes Writer (2002) even contends that such rhetorical 
strategies sanctioned wholesale violence in such a way as to constitute 
a form of state-sponsored terrorism against American Indians. These 
works in rhetorical studies, as well as a great many in American Indian 
studies, demonstrate a connection between violence against American 
Indians and the rhetorical practices of colonizing institutions. 
4 
 
  
    While rhetorical counterinsurgency is an intentional practice 
directed to dissipate threatening and subversive social movements, I 
do not argue that there was a vast conspiracy against the American 
Indian Movement. I merely suggest that there is a connection 
between the uptake of the FBI’s narrative of AIM violence and the 
resources available for public interpretation of their message and 
goals. I seek to extend the theoretical relationship between rhetoric, 
governmentality, and the suppression of social movements by 
examining the consequences of the FBI’s rhetorical construction of 
AIM. The rhetorical dimensions of FBI investigations are a useful site 
at which to explore this relationship because of its role as both an 
information gathering and information producing agency. While the 
agency may not have intended malice, the FBI’s surveillance projects 
had consequences for the possible interpretations of American Indian 
rhetoric and political activism on all fronts, legitimate or criminal. 
    In the Rhetoric of Agitation and Control, John Bowers, Donavan 
Ochs, and Richard Jensen (1993) argue that the “rhetorical stance” 
taken by the establishment against threatening social activism is 
plagued by the constraints of governmentality and social management 
(47). 
The decision makers must show that their ability to manage, guide, direct, and 
enhance the group is great than that of other members in the group. Rhetoric plays 
an important roles in maintaining decision makers in their position of power…One 
principle governs that rhetorical stance taken by any establishment: Decision makers 
must assume that the worst will happen in a given instance of agitation. The corollary 
to that principle is equally important: Decision makers must be prepared to repel any 
attack on the establishment. 
When agencies charged with law enforcement encounter radical social 
movements, they are likely to apply an interpretive framework of 
criminality and deviance to their behavior and prepare against worst 
case scenarios. One important avenue for such preparations involves 
public performances of law enforcement readiness. The public image of 
an establishment as exercising judicious and legitimate countermeasures 
against subversion is a fundamental component of diffusing radical 
agitation. It controls public sympathies and positively frames the role of 
law enforcement. In addition to the discharge of their duties in relation 
to criminal investigations, law enforcement agencies participate in 
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rhetorical activities that shape possible interpretations of their activities 
when confrontations become matters of public record. Garth Jowett 
and Victoria O’Donnell suggest that these (2006, xi) “techniques may 
range over a wide array of symbolic or physical acts, but the central and 
simple purpose is to alter and manipulate public attitudes, perceptions, 
and ultimately behavior in such a way as to beneﬁt those employing 
such techniques.” As Bowers, Ochs, and Jensen suggest, suppression 
strategies require rhetorical to discredit the movement’s message in 
order to “stop the spread of that ideology by hindering the goals and 
personnel of the agitative movement” (54). 
     Law enforcement framing that conceives of radical protest as a 
confrontation with insurgent forces can be a self-fulﬁlling prophecy, 
likely to criminalize social movement behavior in a process of 
asymmetrical escalation to eliminate the threat, real or perceived. 
While rhetorical counterinsurgency is not a conspiratorial enterprise, 
the consequences can disarm valuable social messages, reinforce state 
power, create the conditions for violent confrontation, and demonize 
social movements. This conclusion is particularly salient in the case of 
American Indian dissent because of their vast cultural difference from 
mainstream non-Indian society and history of direct military conﬂict 
with the U.S. government. Craig Smith, Rasmussen, and Makela 
argue that their analysis of government suppression strategies against 
American Indians reveals “clearly the manner in which a Eurocentric 
culture responds to an alien one” (1996, 82). Put differently, the 
vast cultural gap between activist agitating for the return of Indian 
lands and the interests of Euro-American institutions magniﬁed law 
enforcement’s perception of AIM’s growth as dangerous. 
     As a general phenomenon, when marshaled in the defense of 
state interests against so-called subversive activity, practices of 
rhetorical exclusion and rhetorical colonialism constitute techniques 
of governance whereby the state embeds populations, discourses, 
and social institutions in an economy of knowledge, power, and 
meaning. As opposed to the ancient juridical mode in which power 
was exercised through the raw visible spectacle of sovereign violence, 
power is most efﬁciently exercised through the discursive practices 
that arrange ideas, signs, and meanings in speciﬁc conﬁgurations that  
then enable particular applications of state interests to the management 
of populations. Michel Foucault explains (1977, 102): 
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This discourse provided, by means of the theory of interests, representations and 
signs, by the series and geneses that it reconstituted, a sort of general recipe for 
the exercise of power over men [sic]: the ‘mind’ as a surface inscription of power, 
with semiology as its tool the submission of bodies through the control of ideas; the 
analysis of representations as a principle in a politics of bodies that was much more 
effective than the ritual anatomy of torture and execution. 
While the direct application of violence to the body had once served as 
a primary method of state control, it was the metamorphosis of punitive 
justice into a ubiquitous strategy of normalization, regimentation, and 
management that sustained the existing social order. While force is 
still a political fact of governmentality, it is the ability of the state 
apparatus to control the interpretation of social violence that enables 
the effective administration of both overt and covert punitive practices. 
While Foucault is concerned with the diffusion of such practices into 
the social body, it is important that critics not lose sight of the rhetorical 
techniques that enable particular types of governing relationships in 
which the direct application of force is made possible, and in some 
instances inevitable. For the purposes of this essay, governance 
or governmentality is deﬁned by a set of rhetorical techniques that 
enable particular types of control not necessarily a singular location 
or institution. 
     Greene extends the relationship between rhetoric and 
governmentality by arguing that “rhetorical practices stabilize 
meaning by distributing populations, discourses and institutions on 
the terrain of a governing apparatus so that a series of judgments 
might be made about the art of government” (30). While Greene 
explains the relationship between rhetoric and governance as the 
unfolding of practical reasoning through deliberation, I apply this 
theoretical understanding to the informal processes of governance 
that seek to undermine the public’s deliberative capacity. Extending 
Greene’s observation that rhetorical practices help calibrate governing 
apparatuses, I argue that rhetorical counterinsurgency extends 
governmental administration by ﬁne-tuning mediated networks of 
public discourse, often through disinformation, counterintelligence, 
and propaganda, to produce ideological interpretations of threats to 
the existing order and responses to those threats. This is accomplished 
through the controlled production and circulation of knowledge 
about dissident populations. Such practices are sustained through the 
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circulation of information and its recirculation through government 
bureaucracy and mass-media sources. 
     Through surveillance, agent provocateurs, and amassing 
intelligence about subversive organizations, law enforcement agencies 
achieve totally mastery over information. The subsequent bureaucratic 
analysis of intelligence data and its recirculation through media sources 
for public consumption completes a feedback loop where intelligence 
is turned into a carefully crafted strategy to shape public memory 
about government and movement activities. The process of informing 
and intelligence gathering is a generative moment for the rhetoric of 
counterinsurgency. In his probative work on the operations the FBI”s 
Counterintelligence Bureau (COINTELPRO), Nelson Blackstone 
argues that (1975, xi) “Informers don’t just passively take notes. They 
act. And they act out of their loyalty to the FBI, not to the political 
group. Therefore, informers interfere with the freedom of speech 
and association of those members who have the best interests of the 
organization at heart.” Completing the functions of governmentality, 
informing, gathering intelligence, and surveillance are deployed to 
articulate interested knowledge about targeted populations. Information 
circulation has a synergistic effect of continually calibrating the 
mechanisms of state repression and control. Foucault explains that 
these techniques produce “compulsory visibility” whereby subjects 
are rendered visible, knowable, and pliable to the exercise of power 
while the mechanisms of such power are made invisible (187). In the 
case of addressing threats and suppressing dissent, the production of 
knowledge about threatening movement activities mystiﬁes the inner- 
workings of power by rendering techniques of the FBI increasingly 
difﬁcult to identify. The FBI’s construction of AIM as an insurgent 
guerrilla terrorist organization with communist ties obscured any 
rationale for their activity, decontextualized their use of force, and 
justiﬁed extreme responses to their agitation. 
Migrating Contexts of Insurgency 
    The FBI’s rhetorical construction of AIM marshaled easily 
identiﬁable discourses concerning political violence, both international 
and domestic, to offer interpretations of their radical agitation and 
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justify extreme measure of repression. Topoi of insurgency, communist 
inﬁltration, and guerrilla warfare drew from the culturally available 
explanations of threats to the existing order that emerged in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s. Cold War critic Robert Ivie characterizes such topoi as the 
culturally available assumptions or resources of invention rhetors use 
to (1980, 282) “generate a number of speciﬁc statements that serve as 
premises, warrants, or points of identiﬁcation in support of predetermined 
claims.” Multiple overlapping historical contexts illuminate the cultural 
topoi available to discuss radical American Indian activism and the FBI’s 
choices to invent and contain their agitation from 1971 to 1976. First, 
the looming specter of Viet Cong guerrilla warfare in Vietnam and the 
Cold War political culture obsessed with containing the ubiquitous and 
amorphous threat of communist inﬁltration provided a readily available 
lexicon of threat assessment, construction, and response. Radical protest 
organizations that articulated subversive political critiques of American 
imperialism and advocated confrontation and resistance (such as the 
AIM, the Black Panther Party, Students for a Democratic Society, the 
New Left, and a litany of other groups) fell under the purview of the 
FBI’s COINTELPRO program and associated surveillance programs. 
As Sociologist David Cunningham explains, FBI counterintelligence 
programs were designed to (2003, 329) “’expose, disrupt, misdirect, 
discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of protest groups and 
individual ‘key activists’ that, in their view, engaged in actions that 
threatened the security of the U.S. government.” Historian James 
Davis (1997) compiles evidence that these operations were honed 
ﬁrst against radical organizations of the political left and right: the 
American Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Ku 
Klux Klan. In his systematic analysis of the use and purpose of the FBI’s 
counterintelligence programs against the New Left, Cunningham argues 
that the counterintelligence program were dangerous because they 
blurred the line between foreign and domestic enemies and between 
protest and national security threats (2003b, 234): 
The history of the organization, especially under J. Edgar Hoover but in some important 
ways today as well, shows a consistent pattern of deﬁning abstract threats (whether 
they be from anarchists, communists, or terrorists) that are then found and dealt with 
in an often self-fulﬁlling manner. The larger purposes of such activity, beyond the 
preservation of national security, have undoubtedly included self-aggrandizement and 
securing ever-increasing budgetary allocations (Donner 1980; Powers 1987). 
9 
 
  
The FBI’s rhetoric concerningg social movement activism tended to 
reduce the motives for agitation to either communism or terrorism. 
Their inability to distinguish protest from domestic insurgency was 
connected to circulating discourse about the ambiguous nature of 
threats to American power. These discourses solidiﬁed prior to the 
full-scale development of FBI counterintelligence; from the end of 
World War II through the height of the McCarthy-era in 1955. Director 
J. Edgar Hoover argued that it was his organization’s charge to expose 
“a force of traitorous communists, constantly gnawing away like 
termites at the very foundations of American society” (Hoover 1950, 
quoted in Grossman 1995, par. 31). Hoover’s dubious construction 
of communism itself was, at best, an empty signiﬁer and at worst and  
misleading label for all perceived threats to national security. Anti- 
war movement historian Tom Wells suggests that (1994, 4) “ofﬁcials  
attributed the wellsprings of dissent more to emotionalism, character 
ﬂaws, and sinister external forces than reasoned judgment. Indeed, 
both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, and many of their aides, 
were convinced that foreign communists were behind the dissent.” 
Furthermore, Fredrik Logevall suggests that regardless of the public 
reception of such messages about the nature of communism and 
domestic insurgency, “those on the left who might have put forth 
an alternative vision no longer had cultural or political approval. 
Those on the right had the ﬁeld largely to themselves” (2001, 82). As 
Hoover suggests, the communist threat was perceived by the FBI and 
other law enforcement organizations as foreign and domestic, a ﬁfth  
column threatening to collapse America from within through partisan 
resistance. The threat was not only from the Moscow and Peking, but 
from the collective strength of “terminates,” small infestations taking 
a variety of forms from guerilla warriors in Vietnam to subversive 
radicals within the United States. As I argue later in the analysis, 
while the FBI concern about AIM was also connected to their militant 
demand for the return of Indian lands, they also express paranoia that 
Indian activists are linked to communist organizations within and 
outside of the country. 
     The military context of the Vietnam War is essential to understand 
the FBI’s rhetorical construction of AIM. The tactics and topoi used 
to construct and confront the communist threat in Vietnam migrated 
into the domestic public sphere. First, in addition to the amorphous 
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specter of communism, communication historian Christopher Simpson 
(1994) argues that the concept of “worldview warfare,” psychological 
and ideological indoctrination, emerges from collaboration between 
the U.S. military and applied researchers in mass communication. 
Simpson argues that during World War II, worldview warfare 
techniques were used to immunize immigrant populations against 
Soviet and Axis propaganda. Simultaneously, during the Kennedy 
Administration, the U.S Special Forces were formed to developed 
new military strategies and war-ﬁghting doctrines to deal with sub- 
national, guerrilla, or insurgent military forces (Marquis 1997). 
The concept of counterinsurgency ﬁrst appeared in the U.S. Army 
Special Forces manual titled Counter-Insurgency Operations in 1960 
(McClintock 1992). Given that insurgent or paramilitary forces could 
camouﬂage as and within civilian populations, counterinsurgency 
operations relied on subtle yet confusing distinctions between 
military and civilian targets. Counterinsurgency tactics were used 
against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces because of their 
ability to conceal guerilla activity within humble natural landscapes 
and everyday village life. Counterinsurgency operations during the 
Vietnam War aimed to eliminate the natural advantage of a popular 
insurgent force through a variety of tactics designed to undermine their 
human resource based including, but not limited to, the use of chemical 
defoliants to erode the Viet Cong’s environmental resources and 
indirect training and support of South Vietnamese paramilitary forces 
(Nagl 2002). Simpson argues that counterinsurgency and worldview 
warfare operations also expanded to include economic development 
projects “to win the hearts and minds of Vietnam’s peasant population 
through propaganda, creation of ‘strategic hamlets,’ and similar forms 
of controlled social development under the umbrella of U.S. Special 
Forces troops” (84). 
    While not directly causal, the simultaneous emergence of 
foreign and domestic counterinsurgency operations demonstrates 
the development of a situated vocabulary, and corollary approach 
and attitude, toward radical organizations in the United States and 
abroad. As Simpson’s work suggests, the research that emerges 
from academic institutions on propaganda, worldview warfare, and 
counterinsurgency provided the U.S. government with a range of 
proven tactics to combat emerging threats to national security. These 
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tactics were also communicative, rhetorical, and ideological. The 
ﬁndings of counterinsurgency research provided lessons for modern 
warfare that had dire consequences for radical organizations in the 
United States. Modern warfare was constructed as unconventional. It 
took place in non-traditional settings and required combat in civilian 
settings, always in an ideological struggle for hearts and minds. 
     Finally, the social and discursive context of conquering new 
frontiers in Vietnam had profound implications for American Indian 
activism in particular. The application and circulation of Indian 
Country and frontier metaphors to describe the conﬂict-zone in 
Vietnam reanimated the topoi of savagery used by the U.S. military 
in the previous century to combat Indian violence and guerrilla 
resistance on the frontier. Literary critic David Espey (1994) argues 
the American Indian subtext to military perceptions of the Viet Cong, 
along with popular representations of the Vietnam War in ﬁlm and  
literature, created strong parallels between the mythology of the 
American frontier and rationalizations for brutality against the North 
Vietnamese (par. 1): 
Among the many changes in American culture inﬂuenced by the Vietnam War in the  
years 1968-75 were transformations in the popular image of the American Indian 
and in Native American political consciousness. Vietnam and the Indians share a 
curious association in the American imagination. In the early years of the war, the 
United States often thought of Vietnam in images of the American West and cast the 
Vietnamese in the role of Indians. 
Military commanders and soldiers invoked the mythical Euro-American 
lexicon of Indian Country to describe the untamed wilderness of 
Vietnam and the savagery of the North Vietnamese. Espey traces the 
frontier theme through the ofﬁcial rhetoric of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the expressions of on-the-ground Vietnam veterans to uncover 
how the imagery of Indian savagery pervaded their orientation toward 
the Vietnamese. In the eyes of the U.S. military, the tactics of guerilla 
warfare employed by the Viet Cong bared similar markers to those 
experienced by the U.S. cavalry in the nineteenth century (Slotkin 
1973; Drinnon 1997). In his book Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional 
Warfare in American History, John Tierny (2007) explains that 
military confrontation with Seminoles, the Sioux, and the Navajo, 
often resulting in massacres, were their earliest and most haunting 
12 
 
  
encounters with guerilla warfare. While tribal resistance tactics were 
by no means monolithic, Tierny argues as follows (78): 
Yet, there was at least a common denominator between all the tribes and all of the 
centuries. The Indians almost always fought in unorthodox, irregular fashion: their 
lack of discipline and organization, their stealth and surprise, their disdain for rules 
or procedures, their dress, their tactics, their attitudes – all of these attributes were 
unorthodox in comparison to either European or U.S. Army training manuals and 
battle procedures. Some tribes, moreover, were extremely adept at sustained and 
disciplined guerrilla war, as distinguished from irregular battle habits. The Seminoles, 
the Sioux, and the Navajo were high on the list. But throughout the long years of 
Indian warfare the settler had to cope with the type of adversary he could never 
understand from textbooks. 
Indian Country constitutes one of the most powerful topoi available 
to construct the ambivalent mission in Vietnam. To explain the 
ubiquity and circulation of meanings of guerrilla warfare, Espey also 
demonstrates the uptake of Indian War metaphors in popular culture, 
such as the John Wayne ﬁlm The Green Beret (1968) in which the 
Vietnamese speak and act like caricatures of Sioux warriors. Espey 
cites other literary and popular culture critics have observed the 
Indian-Vietnam connection. For example, Phillip Melling (1990) 
identiﬁes strong similarities between the New England Puritan 
garrison mentality, Indian “captivity narratives,” and soldier narratives 
that construct the profane space of Vietnamese wilderness as iconic of 
the savagery of Vietnamese guerilla warfare. Furthermore, Michael 
Yellow Bird, Director of the Center for Indigenous Nations Studies 
at the University of Kansas, argues that metaphors of cowboys and 
Indians provided a context for dehumanization in Vietnam (2004, 
43): 
One of the most infamous massacres embodying the cowboys and Indians theme 
was My Lai, where American soldiers murdered as many as ﬁve hundred unarmed 
civilians—old men, women, and children. A unit of Charlie Company, First Battalion, 
Twentieth Infantry, the soldiers responsible for this slaughter, said that My Lai was 
inevitable because the Viet Cong were regarded as Indians. 
While the evidence suggests parallels between the construction of 
Indian savagery and similar types of violence enacted a century later 
in Vietnam, I seek to bring that context back to the domestic politics of 
radicalism to explain the effectiveness of rhetorical counterinsurgency 
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against American Indian activists. The ways in which images of Viet 
Cong and Indian militants stand in the place of one another demonstrates 
the resource of invention available for the U.S. military, the FBI, and 
other law enforcement agencies embedded within constructed scenes 
of insurgency and counterinsurgency to rationalize their perceived 
enemy. Enacting counterinsurgency domestically against American 
Indian radicals reproduced the rhetorical forms and contexts of parallel 
insurgent environments and necessitated the application of topoi that 
rationalized counterinsurgency against a guerrilla enemy. Thus, in 
their enactment of counterinsurgency against AIM, the FBI marshaled 
topoi of communist inﬁltration, guerrilla enemies, and irrational or 
unjustiﬁed violence. While the FBI proceeding against AIM as if this 
were truly the case, the FBI also utilized rhetorical venues to shape 
the publics interpretation of AIM’s radical and unconventional form of 
agitation. I identify two complementary and sometimes contradictory 
images of AIM: the communist surrogate and the Viet Cong guerrilla. 
AIM as Communist 
    In 1971 the Senate Internal Security Administration released a 
report titled “The Assault on Freedom” of which a large section was 
devoted to exposing the ties between the Communist Party and the 
American Indian Movement. The report, referenced for its accuracy 
by the Senate Judiciary committee in 1976, alleged Indian activism 
was directly connected to a world-wide communist revolution (2): 
The Communist Party for more than a year now has been both supporting and 
sparkplugging the so-called “American Indian Liberation Movement.” The decision 
to make the Indian Liberation Movement a major point of emphasis was made at a 
“National Conference of Indian Liberation” convened “somewhere in the Western 
United States” in November 1969 . . . Communist Party Chairman Henry Winston 
keynoted the conference by describing the Indian Liberation Movement as “one of the 
four major national struggles in our country.” 
Throughout the organizations ascendance to national prominence, 
law enforcement searched to connect AIM to a broader network of 
conspiracies including both the U.S. Communist Party as well as 
foreign communist insurgents. The rhetoric of anti-communism 
served three functions. First, however dubious the claim may have 
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been, the link to communism highlighted that a force other than 
Indians was in control of the organization. This enabled the FBI to 
make arguments that AIM did not speak for a majority of American 
Indians. In the 1976 Congressional hearing on Revolutionary Activities 
within the United States, Senator James O. Eastman, argues there was 
a connection between AIM and the American Communist Party. As 
a result, real Indians were not in control of AIM. He argues that “the 
record is clear that the elected tribal councils look upon the American 
Indian Movement as a radical and subversive organization” (2). 
Second, the rhetoric linked Indian activists to an omnipresent enemy 
of Soviet inﬁltration that reemerged camouﬂaged as a seemingly 
benign organization. Decades of cultural knowledge about the scourge 
of communism could be easily mapped onto AIM’s rhetoric and 
activism. This rhetoric reduced the complexity of AIM’s message from 
a struggle for social justice to a simple plot of communist deception. 
Third, it highlighted the urgency of immediate action to counter the 
threat, speciﬁcally by the FBI which had taken early propriety over 
communist investigations and counterintelligence in the 1950’s. 
     While AIM did express anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist views, 
their demands were more particular than universal. They demanded 
speciﬁc rights in the area of tribal self-determination; the enforcement 
of guaranteed treaty rights, elimination of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, preservation of an Indian land base, and a return to traditional 
indigenous languages, religions, and lifestyles. American Indian 
intellectual Vine Deloria humorously notes that while (1974, 3) “the 
New Left welcomed Indian activist at its rallies” such movements 
were shocked to learn that “Indians were not planning to share the 
continent with their oppressed brothers once the revolution was over.” 
While AIM shared goals with other minority, Third World, and even 
communist groups, their struggle was speciﬁc to the Indian experience 
in North America. Deloria argues that AIM activists understood their 
demands and tactics as a continuation of a deeply historic Indian 
struggle as opposed to being new and derivative. While they were 
sympathetic to the Marxist critique of American capitalism emerging 
within the New Left, AIM did not ﬁt because there was no place for 
the return of Indian lands as a collective goal. 
     AIM, originally called CIA (Concerned Indians of American), was 
founded in Minneapolis in 1968 by Dennis Banks, Russell Means, 
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Clyde Bellcourt, George Mitchell and several other prominent Indian 
activists. Similar to that of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, before 
taking the reigns of self-determination, they served as a watch-dog 
organization to protect Twin Cities Indians from police harassment 
and brutality (Smith and Warrior 1996; Means 1995). Dennis Banks 
(2004) notes that most, including him, did an extensive amount of time 
in the state penitentiary because they were too poor to raise bail or hire 
legal council. In his autobiography, Leonard Peltier (1999) humorously 
refers to the Minnesota state penitentiary as the “Indian ﬁnishing  
school” for his generation of AIM activists. AIM members organized 
to report and monitor police abuse, provide legal council and raise 
bail for Indian defendants, and unify the Twin Cities American Indian 
community (92). AIM quickly ascended to national prominence as an 
activist organization in part because of the rising ethnic nationalism 
expressed in the ﬁshing rights protests in Washington State, the 
occupation of Alcatraz Island, and a series of other occupations at Mt. 
Rushmore, Pit River, and Plymouth Rock (Cobb and Fowler 2007; 
Johnson 2007; Nagel 1997). AIM chapters quickly sprouted in several 
other U.S. cities. AIM grabbed the attention of law enforcement when 
they occupied the small town of Gordon, Nebraska in 1972 to protest 
what they characterized as misconduct in the prosecution of the murder 
of Oglala ranch hand Raymond Yellow Thunder. 
     Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Warrior argue that “The initials—A- 
I-M—underscored all of that, creating an active verb rich in power 
and imagery. You aimed at a target. You could aim for victory, for 
freedom, for justice. You could also, deﬁantly, never aim to please. 
Written vertically and stylized a bit, the acronym became an arrow” 
(127). To match their militant naming and goals, AIM utilized tactics 
that were highly confrontational and unconventional. The use of 
occupations, invasion and inﬁltration of iconic spaces, and symbolic 
reclamations of land as a form of protest classiﬁed AIM one of the more  
extreme and militant organizations of their time. The organizations 
occupation of Bureau of Indian Affairs headquarters as a part of 
“Trail of Broken Treaties” in 1972, suggested the movement shared a 
common goal of exercising their legally guaranteed and spoke with a 
voice attuned to pulse of Indian Country. While their tactics may have 
been controversial within the Indian community, Smith and Warrior 
note that AIM membership “exploded across reservations and cities 
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from North Carolina to the Paciﬁc Northwest during 1972” (138). 
The occupation at Gordon, a result of a plea for help from Yellow 
Thunder’s mother to Dennis Banks and Russell Means, demonstrated 
that ties were improving between urban and reservation Indians. 
     While the name, character, and growing strength of the organization 
indicated that AIM represented the views of Indian Country, the 
rhetoric of anti-communist leveraged by the FBI indicated that either 
the movement’s leaders had betrayed their adherents or communist 
insurgents were exploiting Indian causes to foment revolution. Either 
way, the resulting picture was of a small cadre of radicals that did not 
represent the viewpoints of real American Indians. Senator Eastman 
testiﬁes that “the elected tribal councils speak for the masses of the 
Indian people” (United States 1976, 2). The claim casts doubt on 
whether AIM’s radical tactics and accompanied critique of the BIA 
and federal Indian law accurately represented the views of American 
Indians. The Congressional testimony of undercover FBI agent Douglas 
Durham provides a good representative anecdote of the FBI’s rhetorical 
strategy of anti-communism to cast doubt on AIM’s authoritative 
voice. Durham inﬁltrated AIM from 1973 to 1975 and ascended to 
the highest levels of the organization while collecting what he argues 
was “considerable information regarding its revolutionary activities” 
(United States 1976, 4). In addition to identifying an ideology of 
violence and guerrilla terrorism, Durham goes to great lengths to 
emphasize that AIM is a communist front organization. He contends 
that “it appears the American Indian Movement is gaining more 
credibility with Communist-front organizations and becoming more 
recognized internationally” (9). Durham argues that the movement 
used Indian causes as cover for communist revolution. Exposing what 
he considers a lack of media scrutiny, Durham explains that “there is 
a widespread impression, unfortunately shared by too many people in 
the media, that the American Indian Movement is just simply a reform 
movement committed to creating a better way of life for the American 
Indian. Nothing could be further from the truth” (3). Durham presents 
documents from other organizations that have been disowned by AIM 
as proof that the true voices that represented Indian Country was not 
in control. 
     Like a proverbial red herring, the notion that communists held 
the reigns of the movement side-stepped the entire question of treaty 
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violations as a legitimate subject of protest. Many legal scholars note 
the federal government’s failure to abide by the nearly 400 treaties 
signed and ratiﬁed through the late nineteenth century (Johansen 
2004; Williams 2005; Williams 2001, Wilkinson 1987). An even 
more subtle consequence of communist association was that part of 
justiﬁcation for war in Vietnam was premised on a U.S. commitment 
to treaty obligations and as a corollary, communist violation of 
international treaties. As President Nixon promised in 1969, in contrast 
to communist aggressors “the United States will keep all of its treaty 
commitments.” Deloria argues that (1971, 28) “Richard Nixon warned 
the American people that Russia was bad because she had not kept any 
treaty or agreement signed with her. You can trust the Communists, the 
saying went, to be communists.” The prevailing discourse of Soviet 
Union treaty violations provided evidence as to the moral character 
of communism and low-lighted America’s own treaty abrogation at 
home. Deloria continues that “it would take Russia another century 
to make and break as many treaties as the United States has already 
violated” (28). In the context of a protest movement articulating 
speciﬁc demands to enforce Indian treaties, anti-communist rhetoric 
shifted the burden of proof to AIM, standing in the place of all 
communists, to demonstrate their trustworthiness. The history of U.S. 
treaty violations against American Indians was over-shadowed by the 
crimes and treaty violations of the Soviet Union and other communist 
regimes. The central question became the communist moral character, 
not the degree to which treaty violations against American Indians 
betray the spirit of democracy. Under such circumstances, it would 
seem unreasonable for the federal government to negotiate with AIM 
because communists, much like those in the Kremlin, do not adhere to 
their signed agreements and promises. In fact, communist insurgents 
and despots only understand violence. As the argument goes, only 
democracies abide by international norms and live up to their promises. 
By shifting the focus from AIM’s criticism of America’s own treaty 
violations to the duplicity of agreements and promises of communist 
regimes and the universal character of communism itself, the rhetoric 
of anti-communism disarmed and diffused legitimate critique. 
What’s more, the demands for treaty enforcement were framed as 
generating from communists rather than organically emerging from 
Indian Country. Such demands were portrayed as being contrived by 
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communist opportunists to contain American power by treaties they 
themselves have no intention to follow. 
    The second and third consequence of anti-communist rhetoric 
was that it mapped conveniently over AIM’s tactics and played on 
familiar fears and caricatures that provoked urgency and extreme 
action in defense of freedom. AIM was constructed as a ﬁfth column, 
as one of a number of related organizational instruments of foreign 
communists regimes deployed to inﬁltrate and destabilize the U.S.  
in advance of international revolution. Trimbach and Trimbach, 
summarizing the 1976 report on AIM argue that “It is a frankly 
revolutionary organization which is committed to violence . . . Some 
of AIM’s leaders . . . have visited Castro and/or consider themselves 
Marxist-Leninist” (12). Trimbach and Trimbach, as well as the 
Congressional report, linked AIM to a vast conspiracy of other leftist 
organizations and emerging communist regimes that have inﬁltrated 
the U.S. including “foreign ties, direct and indirect—with Castro, with 
China, with the IRA, with the Palestine Liberation Organization . . . 
the Weather Underground, the Communist Party, the Trotskyists, the 
Symbionese Liberation Army, the Black Panther Party . . . ” (12). This 
argument ﬂattened the wide tactical and political differences between 
each organization, reducing all radical activity as commensurate and 
analytically indistinguishable. Revolutionary activity of any kind, 
from AIM to the PLO, could easily be categorized under an empty 
signiﬁer of communism. By blurring important distinctions between 
the goals of each organization listed above, AIM could be more easily 
categorized as a simple and familiar, yet dangerous enemy. AIM is 
often mentioned among a laundry list of explicitly Marxist-Leninist 
organizations in ways the suggested connections by innuendo. In 
the FBI’s Domestic Terrorist Digest, AIM is mention in the same 
breath as that Puerto Rican Independence Movement and the Weather 
Underground as one of three organizations mobilizing against 
America’s bicentennial celebration. The Digest suggest that AIM was 
organizing to “’blow out the candles’ on America’s birthday cake” 
along with “the Weather Underground to ‘bring the ﬁreworks,’” and 
that “the possibility of Puerto Rican independence groups engaging 
in terrorist activity exists” (1). While AIM was not directly linked 
to Marx-Leninism, the evidence for the Puerto Rican Independence 
Movement is strongly foregrounded in the Digest, suggesting some 
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connection. The inference in this document is that these organizations 
were working together to coordinate attacks for presumably the same 
reasons. 
     The strategic ambiguity of the FBI’s assertion makes it reasonable 
to conclude that because they share similar anti-American and anti- 
imperial sentiments that they could be categorized under a master 
signiﬁer of communism or Marx-Leninism. As a rhetorical strategy, 
ambiguity and equivocation create identiﬁcation and unity between 
disparate and singular elements. In the case of AIM, the ambiguity 
between elements aggregates enemies under the single sign of 
communism. Ambiguity enables renaming by a process of association 
and disassociation, in which as Kenneth Burke argues one (1973, 174) 
“throws something out by one name and brings it back by another 
name.” Simultaneously, this strategy also creates identiﬁcation among 
those in dialectical opposition to either communism or any of the 
radical groups associated with AIM. Put differently, this rhetorical 
strategy deﬁnes Americans as uniﬁed by what they are not. The 
rhetoric of enemy creation produces homogeneity within opposing 
forces. Sonja Foss, Karen Foss, and Robert Trapp argue that such 
rhetoric enables (2002, 192) “the creation of identiﬁcation among 
opposing entities on the basis of a common enemy.” For the FBI, 
communism was the most sinister homogenous category available 
to describe seemingly un-American activity. The differences among 
radical protest organizations were ﬂattened to create a common 
enemy that desired social disintegration and an end to the American 
way of life. The ever-present and ubiquitous nature of the threat, as 
one organization with many faces, justiﬁed swift and extreme action. 
The FBI represented the revolution as imminent and life threatening. 
Agent Durham contends that “The leaders have repeatedly predicted 
revolution . . . They must be stopped!” (9). 
AIM as Viet Cong 
     AIM’s militancy was met with equal and opposite resistance. The 
FBI approached AIM as a guerilla or domestic terrorist organization 
that harbored intentions to kill in support of their objectives. As 
reﬂected in the testimony of agent Durham, AIM was “dedicated to 
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the overthrow of our Government” and “they have been engaged in 
or planned every type of action model program – known to terrorist 
guerrillas today and have used the ‘propaganda of the deed’ so 
successfully that some of the national media have discussed publicly 
their expertise in this endeavor” (4-5). Throughout their criminal 
investigations of AIM members and their stand-off at Wounded Knee, 
the FBI invoked metaphors of insurgency and military jargon in their 
internal documents and press releases. There were three important 
consequences to the FBI’s rhetorical approach to insurgency. First, it 
reﬂected a misunderstanding of AIM’s revival of the warrior tradition 
as a mode of activism based on community building through self- 
sacriﬁce as opposed to guerrilla bravado. Second, the metaphors of 
guerrilla warfare helped reenact a familiar scene of counterinsurgency, 
drawing from available interpretations of the changing nature of warfare 
both domestically and abroad in Vietnam. Feeling they were facing an 
insurgent force, the FBI deployed techniques of counterinsurgency, 
including inﬁltration of the organization, aggressive investigations 
to disrupt AIM’s activists networks, and counter-propaganda in 
press releases and media reports to inoculate Indian civilians against 
AIM’s message and diffuse potential sympathy in the non-Indian 
public. Finally, the application of such guerrilla warfare metaphors 
demonstrates the inner-workings of the migrating concept of savagery 
across contexts of insurgency to justify extreme measures in defense 
of civilization. 
     First, the FBI confused AIM’s warrior persona as guerrilla 
insurgency. Vast cultural differences between Indian and non-Indian 
culture resulted in what Deloria calls “re-Indianization,” or white 
culture’s divergent interpretation of Indian efforts to recover a romantic 
past (1971, 92). AIM’s tactic of occupation or land reclamation was 
a highly militant and symbolic act that reﬂected a historical warrior 
tradition practiced by American Indians in resistance to westward 
expansion in the nineteenth century. National Indian Youth Council co- 
founded, Mel Thom argued at the dawn of Indian activism in the 1960’s 
that “There was ‘a new Indian’ war.” (quoted in Steiner 1968, 27). 
Stan Steiner, who closely chronicled the rise of the Indian movement, 
elaborates as follows (1968, 27): “It ﬁttingly had begun with the return 
of the warriors from ‘The War of the Whites.’ It was these warriors, 
disguised in their khaki fatigues, who had gone back to the villages of 
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their forefathers from the alien and urban battleﬁelds.” The concept that 
the Indian wars of the nineteenth century were ongoing was a common 
metaphor used to shock Indians out of apathy. Thom contends that 
“The weakest link in the Indian’s defense is his lack of understanding 
of this modern-type war. Indians have not been able to use political 
action, propaganda, and power as well as their opponents” (quoted in 
Steiner 1968, 43). Thom explains that by modern warfare, he meant a 
transformation of warfare from direct military violence to the seemingly 
benevolent practices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. For Thom and 
other emerging Indian activists such as Clyde Warrior, Richard Oakes, 
Russell Means, and Dennis Banks, the modern assault against Indians 
was direct against community solidarity and identity through practices 
such as “termination,” which sought to sever the federal government’s 
trust relationship with Indian nations and “relocation,” which lured 
Indians off reservations in promise of employment and assimilation. 
While the younger generation of Indian activists did not rule out the 
use of violence, their concept of warfare was based on defending and 
building Indian communities against assimilation and other practices 
that undermined self-determination. The new generation of 1960’s 
Indian activists was interested in alternatives to political reformism 
as opposed to the empirically losing proposition of direct military 
conﬂict against the federal government. 
     Occupation was a ﬁtting practice given the movement’s disillusion 
with the political process, and even conventional social protest, to 
obtain self-determination. Sioux activist Dick McKenzie captured 
the new radical thinking and alienation that then dominated the 
consciousness of young Indian militants when he argued that “Kneel- 
Ins, Sit-Ins, Sleep-Ins, Eat-Ins, Pray-Ins, like the Negroes do won’t 
help us. We would have to occupy the government buildings before 
things would change” (quoted in Steiner 1968, 45). While critical of 
the movement’s inability to leverage the necessary legal arguments to 
justify the tactic, Deloria argues that occupations could have been used 
“as a symbolic and political expression of the more general problem of 
instituting a program of land restoration by the federal government” 
(1974, 38). As a result, Deloria suggests that occupations created 
ﬁerce resistance to Indian militancy, thus, “try as they might, Indians 
could not convince the non-Indians of the logic or historical validity 
of their ideas” (1974, 24). The revival of what Thom called a warrior 
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tradition of resistance was mysterious and threatening to a non- 
Indian audience. Several rhetorical critics who analyze the American 
Indian Movement argue that contemporary non-Indian society had no 
frame of reference to interpret their militant message. Sanchez and 
Stuckey argue that AIM activists had to overwhelm the (2000, 126) 
“preconceived, stereotypical, and/or negative images concerning what 
it meant to be ‘American Indian.’” Richard Morris and Philip Wander 
argue that Euro-Americans fundamental misunderstanding of Indian 
experiences, cultures, and histories made it (1990, 166) “virtually 
impossible for them to achieve self-determination or establish a ﬁrm 
foundation for communicating with the dominant society.” 
     Infamous activist Leonard Peltier argues that non-Indian 
audiences did not understand the warrior tradition adopted by AIM: 
“We have to really start doing stuff: build community gardens, chop 
wood, hauling water. Whatever they needed doing because that’s what 
your responsibility is. Not just prancing around with a gun in your 
hand and thinking you’re showing everybody you’re tough. In our 
society that’s not a warrior role” (quoted in Incident at Oglala 1992). 
In his introductory history to the American Indian Movement, Jeremy 
Schneider (1976) contends that AIM members understood warriorism 
as a dedication of self-sacriﬁce for the community. While AIM 
constructed a pan-Indian ethos, their uptake of a generic warriorism 
reﬂected a strong Sioux presence. The rhetorical inﬂuence of Sioux, 
and other traditional warrior cultures, explains the movement’s heavy 
reliance on the imagery of famous warriors such as Geronimo, Red 
Cloud, Crazy Horse, and Sitting Bull as a source of mobilization. 
Troy Johnson, Duane Champagne, and Joane Nagel explain that the 
movement (1997, 19) “drew selectively on many elements of Indian 
history, especially symbols of resistance.” Warriorism was mobilized 
by AIM leaders as a way to reconnect American Indians with a rich 
cultural history of resistance and survival. While I do not suggest that 
AIM was a paciﬁst victim of government repression, I argue that the 
cultural gap between Indian and non-Indian interpretations of the 
warrior tradition, alongside predominant discourses that linked militant 
self-determination to guerrilla warfare, rationalized interpretations 
of AIM as insurgents. While it is certainly the case that occupation 
was a confrontational and sometimes violent activity, AIM members 
contended that the warrior’s primary role was to build and defend their 
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community. Warriorism, however, was interpreted as either a primitive 
attachment to a romantic past or a violent call to arms. Deloria argues 
that the problem of warriorism, for AIM and Sioux culture alike, 
was that non-Indian audience lacked the proper lens through which 
to distinguish between the civilian and military role of the warrior. 
Deloria contends that “the fairly respectable thesis of past exploits in 
war, perhaps romanticized for morale purposes, became a demonic 
spiritual force all its own.” (1971, 91). While Indians recovered a 
romantic past, non-Indians audience redeﬁned Indians “in terms 
that white men will accept, even if that means re-Indianizing them 
according to white man’s idea of what they were like in the past and 
should logically become in the future.” (1971, 92). For non-Indians, 
the concept of Indians “on the warpath” conjured up cultural images 
of tribal warriors raiding caravans and ﬁghting the U.S. cavalry. Even 
worse, the only contemporary analogue of warrior culture in which 
warfare served a civilian and military function emanated from the 
U.S. war in Vietnam and the insurgent practices of the Viet Cong. The 
FBI argued that AIM’s warrior culture was a cover from crime and 
terrorism. Trimbach and Trimbach’s most recent exposé articulates the 
FBI’s perception of the rhetoric of resistance as a diversionary tactic 
from a violent criminal conspiracy. They argue that “invoking familiar 
themes of warrior bravery versus government oppression became a 
very effective means of diversion from matters of criminality” (7). 
     Second, with a belief they were in a guerrilla conﬂict situation, 
the FBI approached prosecuting the movement by the same rules 
of engagement as counterinsurgency. In their tactical response to 
the occupation of Wounded Knee, South Dakota the FBI, aided 
by news media covering of the event, reenacted an insurgency- 
counterinsurgency dialectic to interpret AIM’s confrontational politics. 
While they may have had the best intentions, the overwhelming display 
of law enforcement and military equipment throughout the occupation 
suggests a heightened and perhaps exaggerated threat perception on 
behalf of the FBI. The occupation of Wounded Knee began as a conﬂict 
between AIM afﬁliated traditionalists and the more conservative Oglala 
tribal government in early 1973. AIM had assembled at Pine Ridge to 
assist tribal members alleging corruption on the part of tribal chairman 
Richard Wilson. Residents alleged that in addition to embezzling 
tribal funds, Wilson was pliable to ﬁnancial incentives from energy 
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corporations interested in non-petroleum energy resources including 
coal and uranium (Messerschmidt, 1983). In response to a growing 
AIM presence at Pine Ridge, Wilson asked for and received assistance 
from Federal Marshals, the FBI, and the BIA to contain an impending 
showdown. In an act of protest, a large group of AIM members and 
reservation residents held a press conference at the historic site of 
the 1890 Wounded Knee massacre. On 27 February 1973, Wilson’s 
personal security force (Guardians of the Oglala Nation), the FBI, the 
BIA, Federal Marshals, and other local law enforcement blockaded 
the group, marking the start of a four-month stand off at Wounded 
Knee. At the initial assembly at Calico Hall precipitating the blockade, 
Russell Means issued a deﬁant message to law enforcement: “The only 
two options open to the United State of American are 1) They wipe out 
the old people, women, children, and men, by shooting and attacking 
us. 2) They can negotiate our demands” (quoted in Akwesasne Notes 
1974, 35). While the occupation may have been unforeseen, AIM 
members decided to stand their ground and occupy the hallowed site 
in deﬁance. 
    The resulting 71-day stand-off between AIM and law enforcement 
was a spectacle with corresponding displays of military force by 
both the FBI and AIM. During the occupation both sides exchanged 
gunﬁre resulting in the death of two AIM occupants and injuries to 
law enforcement, the occupants, and members of the local community. 
While AIM members possessed a cache of weapons to hold their 
ground, the corresponding display of force by law enforcement was 
spectacular. John Williams Sayer (1997), Fellow at the Institute of 
Legal Studies, offers evidence of the amount weaponry involved, 
including military supplies (1997, 146): 
The equipment maintained by the military while in use during the siege included ﬁfteen 
armored personal carriers, clothing, riﬂes, grenade launchers, ﬂares, and 133,000 
rounds of ammunition, for a total cost, including the use of maintenance personnel 
from the national guard of ﬁve states and pilot and planes for aerial photographs, of 
over half a million dollars. 
In addition, journalist Steve Hendricks (2006) argues that armored 
personnel carriers and other equipment designed for use in combat, 
including two Air Force Phantom jets and three helicopters, were used 
throughout siege (132-133). In an unfortunate connection, the same 
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types of jets were used in combat missions in Vietnam. Hendricks, 
relying on Senate testimony, argues that Army Vice Chief of Staff 
Alexander Haig order military advisers to oversee the transfer of 
military equipment, train federal marshals to use grenade launchers, and 
oversee military protocol and rules of engagement with the occupants. 
While Smith and Warrior concur that there is strong evidence of indirect 
military involvement, they conclude it was more of a reactionary fear 
of violence than any sort of vast government conspiracy assert by AIM 
members with “fondness for rhetorical excess and an exaggerated sense 
of self-importance” (212-213). In fact, the military’s presence may 
have restrained law enforcement given that a Pentagon memorandum 
argues that “the seizure and holding of Wounded Knee poses no threat 
to the Nation” (Smith and Warrior 1996, 213).1 Not withstanding the 
restraint and professionalism of military advisers, the introduction 
of military props and staging of combat scenery at Wounded Knee 
contributed to a counterinsurgency framework in which it would have 
been reasonable, however distorted, for law enforcement agents to 
believe they were involved in a guerrilla conﬂict. An FBI teletype 
issued on 24 April 1975, comments on “the use of FBI, U. S. Marshals 
and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Police at Wounded Knee, South 
Dakota, during the period February 27-May 8, 1973, in a paramilitary 
law enforcement situation” (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990, 250).2 
The teletype also identiﬁes problems “in adapting to a paramilitary 
role” when confronting AIM at Wounded Knee (252). The document 
goes on to detail the military training and equipment provided to the 
FBI by the U.S. military including “Armored personnel carriers, M- 
16’s, automatic infantry weapons, chemical weapons, steel helmets, gas 
masks, body armor, illuminating ﬂares, military clothing and rations” 
(ibid.). In light of such preparations, the FBI made adjustments to a 
new framework of de facto military counterinsurgency as opposed to 
law enforcement. The teletype in question also notes the need to make 
the military preparations less visible because “the use of Army troops 
against these Indians might be misinterpreted by the press” (ibid.). For 
the bureau, it was important to match the ﬁre power of the “militants 
were in possession of an M-60 machine gun and AK-47s (Communist 
automatic assault riﬂes) which could result in heavy casualties” (253). 
The nature of the FBI changed after Wounded Knee due to the type of 
training required to deal with similar insurgent situations. Trimbach 
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and Trimbach reﬂect that “As much as the AIM leadership detested 
the FBI, they might have liked even less the idea that Wounded Knee 
spawned a whole new role for the Bureau” (2007, 272). 
     This context frames the FBI’s use of propaganda, informants, and 
agent provocateurs to win the hearts and minds of the Indian and non- 
Indian public as they made preparations to disrupt AIM’s operations. 
Starting at Wounded Knee through the trial of Leonard Peltier, the FBI 
created strong ties to the national press to counter media savvy AIM 
celebrities such as Russell Means. Trimbach and Trimbach argue that 
the bureau felt as if they had to recover their reputations against the force 
of the alleged “AIM/Media spin machine” (14). During the Wounded 
Knee stand-off, an FBI teletype reveals that the FBI altered the reports 
of KIXI radio reporter Clarence Daniels without his knowledge. An 
FBI teletype reads that McDaniels was “unaware that his stories are 
not being publicized in full or that the intelligence information and his 
tapes are being furnished [by] the FBI” (Churchill and Vander Wall 
1990, 247).3 U.S. Marshals also successfully inﬁltrated the Wounded 
Knee occupant force by sending in a female agent disguised as a 
reported (Burnette and Koster 1974, 58). For security reasons, the FBI 
restricted media access to blockaded areas, forcing reporters to rely on 
sources within the bureau. The FBI offered afternoon press releases 
about the occupation in Pine Ridge village that was miles from the 
occupation site. FBI generated press releases were the primary source 
of information for the public throughout the occupation and they 
generally reﬂected the FBI’s narrative about the events. 
     Third, the rhetoric of wartime savagery associated with insurgency 
and terrorism was used to describe AIM’s occupation of Wounded Knee 
in 1973 through the trail of Leonard Peltier in 1976. As it had within other 
wartime contexts, the rhetoric served as a justiﬁcation for extreme measures 
against the enemy. The FBI press releases described the AIM’s facilities, 
whether houses, tents, or run-down shacks as a “sophisticated bunker 
complex” masquerading as civilian targets.4 A memorandum entitled “Law 
Enforcement on the Pine Ridge Reservation” argued that on Pine Ridge 
There are pockets of Indian population which consist almost exclusively of American 
Indian Movement (AIM) members and their supporters on the Reservation. It is 
signiﬁcant that in some of these AIM centers the residents have built bunkers which 
would literally require military assault forces if it were necessary to overcome 
resistance emanating from the bunkers.”5 
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The implication was that modest and disheveled rural homes and 
shacks were actually disguised military installations. Furthermore, 
using military responses were rationalized as an extreme, but perhaps 
necessary tactic if AIM provoked the FBI. Insurgents are barbaric 
because they do not obey the rules of engagement of civilized conﬂict.  
They use civilians as currency for partisan military resistance. A key 
component of insurgent warfare is that its participants blur the lines 
between civilian and military targets by hiding in seemingly innocuous 
places. Insurgents rely on the support of local communities to provide 
them with the necessary supplies to continue their resistance. In 
instances where it is not given freely by the community, the insurgent 
force holds to community hostage. While Pine Ridge was one of 
the poorest communities in America, the recent military experience 
in Vietnam demonstrated that in spite of a community’s humble or 
bucolic exterior, paramilitary activity could be proceeding unnoticed. 
Trimbach and Trimbach argue that some of the agents deployed to 
Wounded Knee were well adapted to “their new role as sentries” 
because of their experience in Vietnam “helped to supply badly needed 
tactical operations knowledge” (105). The war-time imagery was not 
lost on the agents. The FBI’s military framing justiﬁed the use of force 
against what may otherwise be interpreted as innocent civilian targets 
typically exempted from the rules of civilized conventional combat. 
     Corresponding images of savagery interpenetrated both American 
Indians and the Viet Cong. Savagery is a dialectical discourse, 
historically marshaled in defense of colonial ambitions and the 
expansion of Western civilization. The roots of savagery can be traced 
to initial European contact with American Indians in which the values 
of civilization were afﬁrmed through conquest of savagery. Fergus 
Borderwich argues that (1996, 18) “in their apparent savagery, Indians 
dramatically underscored Euro-Americans’ notions of civilization, 
while their repeated military defeats seem unchallengable proof of the 
white man’s technological and moral superiority.” Robert Berkhofer 
(1978) argues that the presumption in Western culture of a uniform 
savagery, or a condition of arrested human development, gave rise to 
and vindicated teleological beliefs about the triumph and superiority 
of Western culture. The image of the frontier was the most important 
site at which savagery was transformed into civilization, a universal 
and teleological project of Westernization. The intellectual and cultural 
28 
 
  
imagery of the frontier myth is thus a migratory and ubiquitous 
discourse tied to overcoming savagery. 
     In the context of Vietnam, Ivie argues that administration 
ofﬁcials relied on topoi of savagery “to construct the image indirectly 
through contrasting references to the adversary’s coercive, irrational, 
and aggressive attempts to subjugate a freedom-loving, rational, 
and paciﬁc victim.” (1980, 284). The North Vietnamese were 
constructed as uninvited outside aggressors, committed to ideological 
uniformity, and savage acts of brutality and terrorism (Ivie 1987; 
Ivie 2005). While the image of savagery authorized some soldiers to 
psychologically distance themselves from atrocities committed against 
their Vietnamese enemy, the mirror image of the Viet Cong reﬂected 
back to American guerrillas in order to rationalize counterinsurgent 
responses to Indian militancy. Concomitant with law enforcements 
use of war-time imagery, the Vietnam metaphor did not go unnoticed 
by the occupants of Wounded Knee. In his book Viet Cong at Wounded 
Knee, Blackfoot activist and AIM member Woody Kipp (2004) argues 
that his experience at Wounded Knee reminded him of his own tour in 
Vietnam. Kipp argues that many Indian soldiers empathized with the 
Vietnamese because their “physical resemblance to the Vietnamese 
people” (35). He argues that later, during a gunﬁre exchange at 
Wounded Knee, while illuminated by military ﬂares that he “realized  
the United States military was looking for me with those ﬂares. I was  
the gook now” (126). Whether the connection is literal or ﬁgurative, 
intentional or accidental, AIM was constructed with a similar lexicon 
to the Viet Cong. As Kipp argues, the Viet Cong and AIM were mirror 
reﬂections of one another. The circulating image of the Viet Cong, and 
that of Indian savagery, provided the rhetorical resources for the FBI 
to construct and comprehend the actions of AIM. 
     Like the Viet Cong, AIM was argued to use Indian civilians as 
diversions, human shields, or conduits, willing or unwilling, for 
sustained warfare. The enemy hid their weapon caches in innocuous 
civilian spaces without concern for the danger posed to the community. 
A 2 February 1976 memorandum argues that AIM was “by force of 
arms taking a number of community residents as hostages” (Churchill 
and Vander Wall 1990, 264).6 Agent Durham argues that (4) “they 
have trampled the civil rights of Indians…citizens in the country” and 
that they had imposed a new form of imperialism on Indian Country 
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(8) “utilized to justify revolution and, in many cases, terrorism.” As 
outside agitators, AIM had allegedly distorted the will of the Indian 
people that had once authorized them to agitate on their behalf. They 
used the community to further their own revolutionary goals. The 
idea that AIM is an outside agitator justiﬁed the FBI’s presence at 
Pine Ridge as a way to liberate the local residents. Trimbach and 
Trimbach argue that AIM’s presence was uninvited and that “to most 
law-abiding Native Americans, however, the FBI was the only reason 
there were not more AIM-involved assaults and murders.” (9). For the 
FBI, AIM guerrilla warriors were willing to sacriﬁce the people they 
were supposedly liberating to further their violent objectives. 
     In addition to savagery and a callous concern for human life, it 
was important for the FBI to demonstrate the AIM guerrilla warriors 
were well-armed and poised to strike. A 4 May 1973 teletype argues 
the Wounded Knee occupants were looking to purchase “automatic 
weapons, bazookas, rocket launchers, hand grenades, land mines, and 
mortars” (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990, 257).7 When a Boston- 
based support group airlifted food and other supplies to the occupants, 
the FBI told the news media they had found “arms and ammunition” 
of which no evidence existed in the ﬂight manifest (Zimmerman 
1976). Like the Viet Cong funneling weapons through civilian 
surrogates, AIM was using humanitarian and philanthropic sources to 
conceal their guerrilla preparations. Sayer argues that during the trials 
of Dennis Banks and Russell Means for their part in the Wounded 
Knee occupation, the government described them as “renegades” and 
“insurgents” that did not speak on behalf of their people but rather their 
own political agenda (1997, 4). Durham, testiﬁed before Congress 
that Banks and Means planned and engaged in terrorist and guerilla 
activity that were “extremely violent and well funded.”(United States 
1976, 5). 
     During the trial of AIM members Bob Robideau and Dino Butler 
for murder of two FBI agents in 1975 (later linked to Peltier in 1977) an 
FBI teletype warns of advanced guerrilla training. The document argues 
that a group of nearly 2,000 Dog Soldiers “who are Pro-American Indian 
Movement (AIM) members who will kill for advancement of AIM 
objectives, have been seen since the Wounded Knee, South Dakota [sic] . 
. . These Dog Soldiers allegedly are undergoing guerrilla warfare training 
experiences” (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990, 278).8 The teletype even 
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suggests the revival of nineteenth century Indian warfare in acts such as 
“sniping of tourists on interstate highways in South Dakota” and “’burn 
farmers’ and shooting equipment” to be committed by Russell Means 
“Hit Men” (279). This language “reindianizes” AIM as nineteenth 
century warriors that circle and attack innocent wagon caravans as they 
cross the Great Plains. While such rhetoric invokes fear and terror, it also 
revives a type of tragic yet romantic savagery that, as Deloria argues is 
a by-product (1971, 91) “of the failure of a warrior people to become 
domesticated.” The separation of caricatures of civilized “law-abiding 
Indians” from the radical warriors holding onto an archaic and violent 
past highlighted the ongoing presence of savagery in Indian Country. 
The law-abiding Indians have assimilated and rationally embraced the 
tenets of Euro-American society while AIM mocks society’s laws and 
terrorizes those that desire the presence of civilization. While the FBI 
may have been unaware of their historical troubled language to describe 
what they considered a very real Indian threat, they participated in the 
rhetoric of savagery that has been traditionally marshaled as a justiﬁcation  
for war from Western expansion in North America through the war in 
Vietnam. Given the movement’s conception of Western history, it is not 
surprising that many Indian activists did not greet the FBI as liberators. 
Suspicion of law enforcement and the U.S. military pervaded Indian 
Country. Many activists that had been shaped by their experience in 
Vietnam identiﬁed much more with their Vietnamese enemy then their 
fellow soldiers. Conversely, the FBI had been affected by experiences 
and imagery of Vietnam. For them, the lesson was that the conditions of 
modern warfare had become blurred and unconventional. They needed 
to adapt to their new role to carry out their mission. Whether the threat 
of AIM was real or perceived, the rhetoric of guerrilla warfare and its 
attendant savagery were the only available topoi for which the FBI to 
conceive of AIM and emergence of domestic radicalism. 
Conclusion 
      Agents Trimbach and Trimbach ultimately argue that there was 
little the FBI could do to save the residents of Pine Ridge, South 
Dakota. The agents make an ambivalent and haunting statement about 
losing the soul of Indian country to AIM (2007, 272): 
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No one wanted to admit it but, in the ﬁnal analysis, the AIM leadership, not Justice 
Department ofﬁcials, ran the show at Wounded Knee. And in a case of supreme 
irony, we had allowed the slow destruction of the village unfold before our eyes. 
It may sound like an old Viet Nam era cliché, but in order to “save the village,” the 
government had to let it be destroyed, house by house. 
In an unfortunate choice of words, the agents reﬂect on an irony of 
the Vietnam War as applied to Indian Country. Upon the destruction 
the village of Ben Tre, journalist Peter Arnett relayed an infamous 
and iconic quote from an unnamed ofﬁcer arguing that “it became 
necessary to destroy the village in order to save it” (quoted in Martin 
2006, 15). From the FBI’s perspective, the savagery of unconventional 
warfare that had migrated from foreign contexts left them with little 
option but to respond in kind to contain what they considered to be one 
of the most dangerous threat of their time. As the argument goes, the 
reckless actions of AIM forced the FBI to reluctantly make unsavory 
calculations to act in what they considered to be the best interests of 
the people of Indian Country and the nation as a whole. 
     While this essay has been highly critical of the FBI’s repression of 
AIM, I suggest neither malicious intent nor a vast conspiracy against 
AIM. While Trimbach and Trimbach suggest, their reputations have 
been dragged through the mud by liberal activists and opportunistic 
academics, their history of AIM is not sacrosanct, nor are their tactics 
beyond criticism. It may be the case that the Bureau had the best 
intentions, and its agents were good people. This essay, however, 
demonstrates the limitations of the FBI’s rhetoric to rationalize AIM’s 
activity as anything other than a communist conspiracy of guerrilla 
warriors. The FBI had a constrained cultural ﬁeld from which to make 
threat assessments about AIM. The omnipresence of topoi concerning the 
chameleon of communist aggression from the Soviet Union to Vietnam, 
the blurred nature of unconventional warfare, the rise of radical domestic 
protest organizations, and cultural mythology about American Indians, 
created a limited rhetorical ﬁeld for those charged with countering such 
threats. With limited resources of invention, the FBI constructed AIM 
as a savage criminal syndicate embodying an amalgam of the worst 
traits of America’s enemies: communists, terrorists, Viet Cong, and 
other revolutionaries. The rhetoric suggests that the FBI believed they 
were involved in an insurgent-counterinsurgent framework. As a result, 
they used methods of counterinsurgency, the rhetorical dimension of 
32 
 
  
which justiﬁed extreme responses to AIM. The FBI’s response to AIM 
illuminates the features of rhetorical counterinsurgency: a technique of 
governance that utilizes public communication strategies and rhetorical 
venues to control the available interpretations of the social order. The 
collection of intelligence information, the use of agent provocateurs, 
close ties to the national press, the public performance of justiﬁed 
force, and the use of available topoi of savagery to interpret social 
unrest, worked synergistically to contain AIM. In the end, however, 
the FBI’s wild fantasies of AIM revolution never came to pass. 
Simultaneously, AIM was unable to achieve any of their twenty point 
demands expressed during the Trail of Broken Treaties. While it may 
have been that AIM was unable to craft a palatable message to achieve 
their political goals, there were factors beyond their control that limited 
the reception of any radical political message. Material and rhetorical 
constraints doomed AIM’s warrior culture to be approached with fear 
and misunderstanding. The FBI’s investigation of AIM demonstrates the 
ambivalent position of Indians in America. To agitate for the political 
changes required for real justice, the return of ancestral lands stolen 
by a settler nation would require the radical upending of the existing 
political order and a massive redistribution of natural resources and 
land that would be unacceptable in even the most favorable political 
climates. The perceived line between agitation and insurgency is much 
thinner than we may realize. The most haunting conclusion critics can 
draw from the FBI’s rhetoric is that if one insists they are in a war, they 
are. 
Notes 
     1. See also Norman Kempster, “Military Ran the Show, Restrained FBI at 
Wounded Knee Siege,” Washington Star, 1 December 1975, A1. 
     2. FBI teletype, “The Use of Special Agents of the FBI in a Paramilitary Law 
Enforcement Operation in the Indian Country,” 24 April 1975, reprinted in facsimile 
by Churchill and Vander Wall (1990, 250-53). 
     3. Excerpt (title and date omitted) from FBI teletype, reprinted in facsimile by 
Churchill and Vander Wall (1990, 247). 
     4. Tom Coll quoted in John Crewdson, “Two FBI Men Die, Indian Slain,” New 
York Times, 27 June 1975, p. 1. 
     5. FBI memorandum, “Law Enforcement on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation,” 
6 June 1975, quoted in Churchill and Vander Wall (1990, 263, 265). 
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      6. FBI memorandum, “To: Director, FBI,” 6 February 1976, reprinted in 
facsimile by Churchill and Vander Wall (1990, 264). The title of the memorandum 
was redacted. 
      7. FBI memorandum, “To Acting Director: American Indian Movement,” 4 
May 1973, reprinted in facsimile by Churchill and Vander Wall (1990, 257-59). The 
teletype alleges that money donated from entertainer Sammy Davis Jr. may be used to 
purchase advanced weaponry to use against the FBI. 
      8. FBI teletype, “American Indian Movement,” 21 May 1976, reprinted in 
facsimile by Churchill and Vander Wall (1990, 277-80). 
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